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CONSUMER PREFERENCE FOR BRAND NAMES
UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
Borden Company sold evaporated milk under its own brand name
at a substantially higher price than it sold chemically identical milk
under private brand names.' The Federal Trade Commission found
price discrimination in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act2 and
issued a cease and desist order prohibiting further price differentials
between the two products. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals granted
Borden's petition to set aside the order, and held: Premium brand
products commanding consumer preference and chemically identical
products sold under private brands are not of "like grade and quality"
within the meaning of the Robinson-Patman Act. Borden Co. v. FTC,
339 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 34 U.S.L. WEEKc 3117
(U.S. Oct. 12, 1965) (No. 1127, 1964 Term; renumbered No. 106,
1965 Term).'
Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-
Patman Act, makes it unlawful "to discriminate in price between pur-
chasers of commodities of like grade and quality ... where the effect
... may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly... ,"' indicating that "like grade and quality" is one of
four jurisdictional prerequisites to the application of the act.5 Each of
the prerequisites must be satisfied by the complaining party before the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) can hear the case. Failure to
meet these prerequisities is ground for collateral attack upon the
Commission's decision for want of jurisdiction. Legislative history of
the Robinson-Patman Act reveals that a difference in brand names was
not intended to affect the "grade and quality" of a product.6 Con-
sequently, in Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,' a landmark decision
1 "It is a common practice for large chain stores, mail order houses, cooperatives,
and dealer associations buying for their membership, to create their own brands and
have those brands, and not the manufacturer's brands, placed on goods purchased for
resale. Such brands are known as 'private brands."' AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION
AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 39 (2d rev. ed. 1959).
2 Section 1, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (Supp. V, 1964).
3 The Borden decision is discussed in 65 COLUM. L. REv. 720 (1965).
4 Section 1, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (Supp. V, 1964).
5 "The act cannot apply unless there are (1) sales (2) of commodities (3) of 'like
grade and quality' (4) in commerce. These four jurisdictional elements must always
be proved by the party plaintiff in any proceeding-whether the Federal Trade Com-
mission or a private suitor." RowE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-
PATMAN ACT 36 (1962).
6 80 CoNG. REc. 8234-35 (1936).
722 F.T.C. 232 (1936), rev'd on other grounds, 101 F.2d 620 (6th Cir. 1939), cert.
denied, 308 U.S. 557 (1939).
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considering brand names in the determination of "like grade and
quality," the FTC prohibited price differentials among identical tires
sold under different brand names.
The court in the principal case reasoned that recognition of brand
names was in accord with the broad antitrust policy of avoiding price
rigidity. Although a difference in labels is alone insufficient to change
the grade of the product, the court found that proof that retailers
will purchase a brand name product at a higher price than identical
private brand products is adequate indication of a change in the
grade of the product on the competitive market. The court reasoned
that adequate precedent for the decision could be derived from an
earlier FTC decision allowing a private brand competitor to lower his
prices below those of a brand name product in order to meet the
latter's competition.8
The decision in the principal case gives new meaning to the price
discrimination section of the Robinson-Patman Act. In recognizing
that consumer preference for a premium brand product is a valid
basis' for determining "like grade and quality," the court followed
the declared policy of the Robinson-Patman Act of avoiding price
sterilization." In keeping with this policy, the court stated:
Were we to ignore the fact that a brand name product may be able to
command a higher price than an unknown brand because of its public
acceptance, then we would be encouraging just such a price uniformity
and rigidity .... 11
The decision in the principal case was not totally unexpected when
8 Calloway Mills Co., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. No. 16800 (F.T.C. Feb. 10, 1964).
9 What precedent existed was found in decisions concerning the "meeting compe-
tition" defense of § 2(b). The significance of these decisions was stated in Callo-
way Mills: "Both the courts and the Commission have consistently denied the shelter
of the (meeting competition) defense to sellers whose product, because of intrinsic
superior quality or intense public demand, normally commands a price higher than
usually received by sellers of competitive goods. For example, the defense will not lie
when the price of Lucky Strikes is dropped to the level of a poorer 'grade of cigarettes,'
Porto Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 234, 237 (2d
Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 858 (1929); when the price of Budweiser beer is
dropped to match the price of non-premium beers, Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 54 F.T.C.
277, set aside for other reasons, 265 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1959), revid for other reasons,
265 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 363 U.S. 336 (1960) again set aside for other
reasons, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961) ; and when the price of a 'premium' automatic
control is set above the price of less acceptable controls, Minneapolis-Honeywell Regu-
lator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351, rev'd on other grounds, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951), cert.
dismissed, 344 U.S. U.S. 206 (1952)." 3 Trade Reg. Rep. No. 16800, at p. 21755. To the
same effect see Standard Oil Co., 49 F.T.C. 923 (1953), rev'd on other grounds, 233
F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1956), aff'd, 355 U.S. 376 (1958) ; Gerber Prods. Co. v. Beech-Nut
Life Savers, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
10 The FTC set out these principles in Automatic Canteen Co. Tr. FTC, 46 F.T.C.
861, aff'd, 194 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1952), rev'd, 346 U.S. 61, 74 (1953).
11339 F.2d at 136.
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one considers the results reached in previous section 2 (a) proceed-
ings. In several informal rulings during 1936-1937, the FTC gave
apparent consideration to brand names when accompanied by phy-
sical differences between products.12 However, ruling on "like grade
and quality" in Hanson Innoculator3 in 1938, the FTC reasserted
the Goodyear rule by prohibiting price differentials of physically iden-
tical products varying only in label inscription. This "physical com-
position" test became the standard under the Clayton Act for deter-
mining "like grade and quality."'" Products having essentially the
same physical characteristics were considered to be of "like grade and
quality" regardless of their brand name." But when manufacturers
sought to avoid prosecution by making insignificant physical changes
in substantially similar products,' a "functional interchangability" test
was conceived.' Under this test, products varying slightly in physical
composition were considered to be of "like grade and quality" if they
served an essentially similar purpose and had no basic functional
differences. In 1958, the Second Circuit, in Atlanta Trading Corp. v.
FTC, 8 applied a third test predicated upon whether differences
between the products were real or artificial. Under all three tests,
however, consumer preference for brand names per se was not a
consideration in determining grade and quality. 9
The court in the principal case expressly confined its holding to
situations involving brand names which are "clearly of commercial
significance."2 It rejected previous administrative decisions which
12 81 CONG. REc. Apr. 2336-41 (1937). See Rowe, Price Differentials and Product
Differentiation: The Issues Under the Robinson-Patnuan Act, 66 YAE L.J. 1, 9
(1956) ; Note, 17 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REv. 133 (1962).
"3 26 F.T.C. 303, 309 (1938). The only material difference in the labels was that
one bore the manufacturer's name and the other the brand name of the private cus-
tomer.
14 See, e.g., Page Dairy Co., 50 F.T.C. 395 (1953) ; United States Rubber Co., 46
F.T.C. 998, 1006-09 (1950) ; United States Rubber Co., 28 F.T.C. 1489, 1500 (1939),
where brand and label distinctions were considered legally insignificant in the "like
grade and quality" determination.
15 See discussion in Cassady & Grether, The Proper Interpretation of "Like Grade
and Quality" Within the Meaning of Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 30
So. CAL. L. Rav. 241, 251 (1957).
16 See, e.g., Champion Spark Plug Co., 50 F.T.C. 30 (1953).
17 See discussion in Note, 17 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REV., supra note 12, at 136-37.
18 258 F.2d 365, 371 (2d Cir. 1958).
19 See AUsTIN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 38; and PATMAN, ComPLExT GuIDE TO THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT 23 (1963). The FTC relied upon a report by the Attorney
General's National Committee which stated: "The majority of this committee, how-
ever, recommends that the economic factors inherent in brand names and national
advertising should not be considered in the jurisdictional inquiry under the statutory
'like grade and quality' test...." ATr'Y GEN. NAT'L COM. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST
RE'. 188 (1955).
20 339 F.2d at 138.
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had not recognized brand names under the act,"' on the ground that
the brands in those cases were not shown to command higher prices.
Referring to one case22 which had held that different labels did not
affect the grade and quality of products represented as being identical,
the court said:
The brand names were not shown to have any effect on the ultimate
price the products could command. Here the Borden brand label was
dearly of commercial significance. At all levels of distribution it im-
parted a premium market value to the Borden products which the private
label did not enjoy.23
The limitation on the scope of the jurisdictional requirement of
"like grade and quality," resulting from the decision in the principal
case, will afford greater opportunity to avoid the act entirely. On
the other hand, proof of one of the defenses under the act (e.g.,
differential in cost of production) would have allowed the FTC to
hear the case, and would only have mitigated the effect of an eventual
decision. Consequently, the jurisdictional basis for the decision in
the principal case should lead to a decrease in the amount of litigation
reaching the courts.
In the principal case the court stated in dictum:
In determining whether products are of like grade and quality, consider-
ation should be given to all commercially significant distinctions which
affect market value, whether they be physical or promotional.2 4
The court was aware that other judicially unrecognized factors in
addition to brand names may induce a buyer to select one product
over another. Although the court does not spell out these additional
factors, such distinctions as merchandise coupons,22 contest prizes,
merchandise packed inside the product, and large scale advertising
may be promotional differences which the court would recognize as
proof that two products are of unlike grade and quality. However,
these suggested differences will be subject to the limitation set forth
in the principal case-that the difference for which recognition is
sought be clearly shown to be the cause of a demonstrated consumer
preference for the higher-priced product.
21- Page Dairy Co., 50 F.T.C. 395 (1953) ; United States Rubber Co., 46 F.T.C. 998
(1950); United States Rubber Co., 28 F.T.C. 1489 (1939) ; Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 22 F.T.C. 232 (1936), revzd on other grounds, 101 F.2d 620 (6th Cir. 1939).
22 Hartley & Parker, Inc. v. Florida Beverage Corp., 307 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1962).
23 339 F.2d at 139.
2-4 Id. at 137.
25 For the influence coupons have in the competitive market, see Gannon, Assault
on Coupms, Wall Street Journal, March 2, 1965, p. 14, col. 4.
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